

17 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Special Staff Meeting Minutes of 17 September 1979

The Director highlighted details of today's PRC meeting which turned into an NSC meeting. As a follow-up, the Director said he has already tasked [ ] to identify a full list of options for increased technical surveillance of Cuba. He asked that [ ] and Taylor identify and submit resources needed to strengthen intelligence initiatives. The Director also tasked Silver to press ahead, not only on legal actions that may be used against Agee but other actions now pending with the Department of Justice, e.g., identity legislation and FOIA. Mr. Carlucci suggested the Director call Attorney General Civiletti and the Director agreed to do so. [ ]

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The Director asked Clarke to: 1) provide him a short piece on the Cuban order of battle; and 2) with Castro's upcoming visit to the UN, identify things we should be prepared for. [ ]

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TOP SECRET

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The Director was attending a PRC meeting; Mr. Carlucci chaired the meeting. [ ]

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Lehman reported the Alert Memorandum on Afghanistan was published 14 September. [ ]

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Stein said McMahon was [ ] speaking to new Career Trainees. (AIUO)

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Taylor reported the Agency's budget for 1981 [ ] --high option) was submitted to OMB on Friday, 14 September. [ ]

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Hitz reported [ ] will brief HPSCI staffers on 19 September re the Cuban situation. Hitz asked about the status of the IIM on Cuba: Mr. Carlucci explained Secretary Vance's request for changes in the draft paper. A brief discussion followed on IIM methodology. [ ]

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Hitz advised that material has been forwarded to [ ] re Mr. Carlucci's briefing to HASC today on Nicaragua and the Sandinista Government. [ ]

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Silver said he was informed by State that an airplane is being sent to Havana today to pick up four Americans jailed in Cuba in exchange for the recent release of four Puerto Rican terrorists jailed in the U.S. In reference to yesterday's Washington Post article: "The 'Hero' of Puerto Rico" (attached), Mr. Carlucci noted he had told columnist Rowland Evans that the CIA has not been involved in the negotiations and Silver confirmed same. [ ]

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May said a revised plan for the Agency's Senior Intelligence Service has been circulated and comments are required by noon tomorrow. [ ]

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have considerable potential, as the weaknesses. It was vague about the final goal of the negotiations. Nor had the Palestinians or Jordanians been consulted about a process that envisaged their eventual cooperation and participation.

These flaws could have been overcome with time. But one key element of the Camp David understandings immediately collapsed. Carter thought he had extracted a commitment from Begin to freeze settlement activity in the West

The writer took part in the negotiation of the Camp David Agreements as a member of the National Security Council staff.

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our already sagging prestige will plummet. This is what justifies an active American role, not the fear of Saudi oil pressure or concern that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will collapse without progress in the Palestinian talks.

President Carter has committed himself to implementing the Camp David accords. He has appointed one of his shrewdest political advisers to represent the United States in the current talks. Failure will damage the reputation of the United States and its two closest allies in the region.

How then to proceed? Not by seeking new U.N. resolutions. Not by chasing after the PLO. And not

ernment can expect no support for its current interpretation that Resolution 242 does not require Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza under any conditions. At Camp David, this issue was sidestepped. It cannot be ignored indefinitely.

More than tangible national interests are at stake in the negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza. Also at issue is whether the United States and its partners, Egypt and Israel, have the skill, the power and the qualities of leadership to find peaceful solutions to dangerous conflicts. The promise of Camp David in September 1978 was that we could. The fear in September 1979 is that we cannot.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

## The 'Hero' of Puerto Rico

President Carter's release of four Puerto Rican terrorists boosted Fidel Castro's prestige in the Third World just as he emerged as its dominant pro-Soviet voice, with the Cuban dictator spicing his triumph by violating one commitment to Washington and going slow on another.

Castro privately offered early this year to swap four Americans jailed in Cuba in return for the four Puerto Ricans held in U.S. jails, promising not to publicly claim credit. The Americans were still in jail five days after the nationalists were released. Castro immediately broke his promise of discretion, in effect proclaiming himself the hero of Puerto Rico.

As the commander of Soviet surrogate troops in Africa and leader of spreading Marxist revolution in the Caribbean and Central America is lionized in the Third World, thanks to U.S. policies. This turn of events is strange even in the wonder-world of Carter administration foreign policy. How did it happen?

The president's decision stemmed not only from a simplistic commitment to "human rights" but also from the desire of some State Department officials to head off further diatribes against the

United States at the Castro-dominated "non-aligned" conference in Havana (which denounced Yankee imperialism anyway). And there is strong evidence Carter was thinking in terms of his own domestic political interests as well.

Although the administration denies any tit-for-tat deal, the original proposal came from Castro himself early this year when a congressional delegation went to Havana to seek release of the Americans. "There need be no negotiations or publicity," Castro privately informed the congressmen. "You've made an appeal and I have proposed a solution."

Carter quickly bought the deal, supported by the State Department's human-rights specialists, but amid doubts by his principal foreign-policy aides.

The doubts were quickly confirmed. Despite Castro's implicit pledge of silence, this headline appeared in the controlled Havana press only hours after the release of the terrorists: "Carter Forced to Release Puerto Ricans." That raised well-founded suspicions that the wily Castro had always intended to parade his conquest over Washington during the non-aligned conference.

Nor was Castro in any rush to fulfill his end of the bargain. At this writing, Washington still expects the release of the Americans, but there has been no move from Havana.

The certainty that releasing the four terrorists would add further glitter to Castro as revolutionary leader prompted a warning to Carter earlier this year from Puerto Rico's Gov. Carlos Romero-Barcelo. "Adversaries of the United States," he said, referring obliquely to Castro, "will interpret the gesture as a tacit admission by the United States that... Puerto Rico's role as a part of the United States is both invalid and intolerable." Unless the four terrorists admit their guilt, the governor added, their release will justify charges that they have been held all these years as "political" prisoners.

Castro has been trumpeting exactly that. The terrorists were "political prisoners," and Puerto Rico, like pre-revolutionary Nicaragua, is a captive of the "colonial" power of the United States.

When the four Puerto Ricans walked out of jail, they threatened to repeat the criminal acts that put them there following the assassination attempt on Presi-

dent Truman and the shoot-up of the House of Representatives. Back in San Juan, they were received as heroes, then went on an island-wide tour reviling the United States and praising Castro.

Simultaneously, on Sept. 13 at a Washington dinner for several hundred leaders of the Hispanic community in this country, Carter claimed political credit for the release of the Puerto Ricans. But it is doubtful that that will gain him the support of any Hispanic Americans.

As of now, not even native Puerto Ricans want independence. In repeated votes, the Independence Party has received negligible support. But that might change with Castro able to claim U.S. recognition as unofficial bargaining agent for Puerto Rican independence.

This performance, coming while Washington seems powerless to push Soviet combat troops off Cuba, suggests the perils of playing to the applause of the Third World in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Those perils are deepened when combined with understandable efforts of an unpopular president to save himself politically.

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The most controversial doctrine was Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" policy, forbidding European powers to interfere in the Americas, it in effect for the United States to establish conditions. The conditions for a series of U.S. treaties in Latin America and the Caribbean.

It is not surprising that a growing doctrine in Latin America was seen as an U.S. hegemony in the region.

The Pan American Union joined in a declaration asserting that all domestic or external matters of another country did not deter or in 1961 or the Dominican Republic, the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay.

Fidel Castro's policy at the just-conference in Havana, the nations including Cuba, the delegation unmoved by Vance's assertion of troop presence.

According to Havana correspondents, "mainly ignored" considered it a influence the closing Cuba's close.

Is Pravda right? Says: "Soviet many years, the program, correct of two attempts to restore the contradictory of international relations."

Why not support international law? organization of consideration enough conference.

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